Littell, Robert: The Defection of A.J. Lewinter (1973, 74k words)

​Espionage

Opening line:  There was a curtain of silence between the end of the play and the first ripple of applause.

A.J. Lewinter, a fortyish specialist in ceramic nose-cones for MIRVs at MIT, goes to the Soviet Embassy on a trip to Tokyo and asks for asylum. The ambitious KGB Station Chief, smelling a career-building opportunity, argues that Lewinter is golden and takes him to Moscow. Meanwhile, in Cambridge and Washington, there is consternation:  What did Lewinter have access to that would benefit the Soviets? What had he taken with him? An investigation reveals that his work on nose cones had not produced major advances, but he had, once, briefly and accidentally, had access to launch trajectories that the Soviets could use to boost the efficiency of their missile defenses. The debate in Washington becomes, how do we convince the Soviets that Lewinter’s intelligence is not all that valuable? If we ignore his defection, will the Soviets conclude that Lewinter is not important? Or will they conclude that the U.S. is trying to convince them he is not important, so his information must be important? In Moscow, the debate becomes, do we really want to rearrange our budget priorities, take money from investments in social infrastructure and double down on missile defense, relying on Lewinter’s information to make it impenetrable? What if Lewinter’s info is already OBE and the Americans are much further ahead? Or what if it’s all a plant and a red herring, and we spend ourselves into poverty with no gain in security? Ultimately, the Russians decide Lewinter’s information is valuable and important and justifies investing in missile defense, but that, if the Americans see them doing so they will change the trajectories and recover their lead, rendering the info valueless. In the final pages, they decide to signal to the Americans that they don’t trust Lewinter, beginning by sending him back home.

Very clever story, and Littell does a very smooth job of distilling the big-think of MAD and missile defense, which roiled the 70s, down to the personal ambitions and reflexes of the bureaucrats involved. We see the Russian officials, all keenly aware of the many ways in which the Soviet experiment has already failed, its abuses and absurdities, yet maneuvering within its constraints to give themselves freedom and pleasure. We see the Americans, trapped in a hall of mirrors where the facts are irrelevant – what is important is what your adversary thinks the facts are and how you can persuade him to ignore real facts while embracing ruses. I doubt espionage in reality is as trapped in this conundrum and frozen in place as Littell’s portrayal suggests, but it is plausible. The depiction of espionage as a bureaucratic enterprise where participants respond to career and personal incentives as much as anything else is entirely believable, though. 

August 20, 2026